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Collaboration technologies are making it easier for organizations and knowledge workers to collaborate across organizational 
boundaries. However, it is necessary for organizations to monitor, regulate and build appropriate security mechanisms in 
collaboration systems to prevent loss of strategic knowledge and competitive advantage. In this paper, we present a risk 
assessment framework that can help organizations identify valuable knowledge assets that can be exposed through 
collaboration technologies, and help prioritize security strategies that can be used to secure the collaboration systems to 
prevent the loss of valuable knowledge assets. We present an illustrative case to demonstrate the feasibility of the framework, 
and discuss issues for future research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Organizations are increasingly using collaboration technologies and systems to move towards collaborative inter-
organizational network structures. Such network structure are being use to manage various business processes such as supply 
chains processes, joint product development, customer relationship management., developing industry standards, and 
engaging in collaborative commerce. In addition to formalized inter-organizational collaboration mechanisms, knowledge 
workers are also using web-based collaboration technologies such as Wiki’s, blogs, discussion forums, social networks and 
online communities to engage in ad hoc collaboration with customers and vendors to exchange knowledge and provide 
improved services. While such inter-organizational collaboration has many benefits, risks pertaining to knowledge sharing 
may arise when knowledge, for example, is transferred to other projects that may benefit competitors. Several news reports 
and companies such as IBM, Cisco reported cases of intellectual property leakage and loss due to insufficient protection of 
knowledge assets (Zhen, 2005; Herbst, 2009; Hamm, 2006; Burrows, 2004). 
    
 
Benefits and risks associated with inter-organizational collaboration and knowledge sharing have been discussed in the 
literature from a very high level and strategic perspective. Significant work has been done in the area of information security 
risk assessment and security mechanisms for inter-organizational collaboration systems. However, their focus is limited to 
technology infrastructure and data and information assets and do not consider knowledge assets. There is limited literature 
that helps identify knowledge assets exposed through collaboration systems, specific risks associated with sharing those 
assets in inter-organizational collaboration, and strategies for selecting techniques to minimize the knowledge sharing risk in 
inter-organizational collaboration. The term risk is used in this study to refer to the potential damage, loss, or negative effect 
of knowledge sharing.  
In this paper, we build on past research in knowledge sharing, secure collaboration systems, and Information Systems risk 
assessment, to propose a preliminary framework for identifying knowledge assets exposed by collaboration systems and a 
mechanism for valuing and securing the exposed knowledge assets. The proposed framework will help organizations 
systematically indentify risks of knowledge sharing and how they can mitigate risks arising due to participants in 
collaborative environment. The proposed framework consists of four specific components that focus on (1) identifying 
knowledge assets, (2) identifying collaboration technologies that expose the knowledge assets, (3) identifying the risk 
associated with the knowledge assets, and (4) a Dempster-Shaefer based model for quantifying the risks.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section provides background and context on inter-organizational 
collaboration. The following section reviews relevant literature in the areas of knowledge sharing and risk assessment 
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methodologies. Then we present the foundations of the proposed risk assessment model, followed by an illustrative case. And 
the final section concludes with a summary of contributions and issues for future research. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Research has suggested that firms are better off when they use and re-use mature internal as well as external ideas in different 
domains, because this is more cost effective than creating the same ideas from scratch (Hargadon and Sutton, 2000). 
Organizations are therefore increasingly exploring inter-organizational knowledge sharing arrangements within an 
environment that allows them to build valuable intellectual capital and knowledge assets (Hardy, Phillips, and Lawrence, 
2003)  
It is important to note that although inter-organizational networks may involve sharing data such as inventory levels, 
information such as sales figures, and knowledge such as best practices, our focus will be only on knowledge. Based on the 
hierarchical view of data, information, and knowledge as discussed by Alavi and Leinder (2001), we define knowledge as 
processed information. Typical knowledge sharing scenarios in an inter-organization network are presented in Figure 1 in the 
context of the value chain of a computer manufacturing organization, where inbound, manufacturing, and outbound logistics 
bring together suppliers, manufacturers, customers, retailers and other partners. The labeled arrows between different entities 
show the flow of different types of knowledge that may take place between the entities. 
As can be noted from the figure, knowledge sharing can appear at any stage or sub-process within the value change of a 
company. For example, component design knowledge can be transferred between a Semi-conductor chips manufacturer and 
the computer manufacturer. Best practices and benchmarking knowledge can be transferred between different computer 
manufacturers. Customer support agents may share product design knowledge with customers and receive customer 
requirements knowledge. While several knowledge sharing activities may have beneficial impacts on the company, harmful 
knowledge sharing activities are also possible. For example, computer engineers and knowledge workers at the computer 
manufacturer may share product design knowledge inadvertently with competitors through communities of practice or ad hoc 
collaborations. Such harmful transfer of knowledge may also occur through regular customer support interactions, or 
interactions with suppliers and vendors resulting in a strategic risk to the computer manufacturer. 
Figure 1. Knowledge Sharing in the Computer Industry 
 
 
Collaboration among organizations can take the form of strategic alliances, where knowledge sharing and acquisition are 
critical for creating customer value and improving competitive advantage (Marshall, Nguyen, and Bryant, 2005). However, 
knowledge sharing may be problematic in such systems since it involves diverse relationships and participants in this system 
may have conflicting interests. For example, risks pertaining to knowledge sharing may arise when knowledge is transferred 
to other projects that may benefit competitors to the firm that owns the original product or when the partner decides to move 
to innovating the basic product (Arakji and Lang, 2007). 
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Thus, a more systematic approach is required to help organizations in identifying and assessing risks and therefore be able to 
design the most effective security measures. Such a framework will enable organizations to take a more proactive approach in 
a given knowledge sharing scenario. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section we present a review of literature in inter-organizational knowledge sharing and information security and risk 
analysis that form the foundation of our research.   
 
Inter-organizational Collaboration and Knowledge Sharing 
Inter-organizational knowledge sharing has been analyzed from three different perspectives: technical, behavioral and 
strategic. The technical perspective is mostly focused on designing and implementing secure systems and architectures for 
collaborative knowledge sharing, while the behavioral perspective includes research that explores behavioral issues related to 
collaborative knowledge sharing, for example: trust and social ties among participants in the same collaborative system.  
The third perspective investigates inter-organizational knowledge sharing from a strategic perspective. This perspective is the 
closest to our study. In order to analyze the strategic impact of knowledge sharing, Levy, Leobbecke, and Powell (2003) 
proposed a game theoretic approach to analyze inter-organizational knowledge sharing among SMEs. To control knowledge 
sharing on the organizational level, most firms depend on legal contracts and policies that govern areas of knowledge 
exchange. Developing these procedures that should ensure high level of control and flexibility at the same time could be 
complex, as explained by Behrend (2006), organizations may use the acquired knowledge beyond boundaries of legal 
agreements describing the knowledge assets to be exchanged, so protecting the key know-how is critical. 
Knowledge sharing may be beneficial in learning, specifically in strategic alliances. According to Medcof (1997), partners 
can learn from each other business and management skills that they were lacking individually. A more strategic view 
suggests that knowledge sharing enables the creation of new knowledge and synergistic solutions (Hardy et al. 2003).  
Knowledge sharing can also play an important role in solving problems. In the supply chain domain, for instance, benefits of 
information sharing were widely discussed as solutions to overcome problems associated with supply chain integration. For 
example, Croson and Donohue (2006) examined how sharing points of sales data (POS) can reduce the bullwhip effect, 
which is a phenomenon that appears in the supply chain where variability in demand increases as we go to the upstream of 
the supply chain (Levi, 2003). To solve this problem, most researchers emphasized that coordination, through sharing 
information, among manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers can reduce this variability (Lin, Wu, Hung, Lin, 
2002).  
Previously discussed benefits should be weighed against risks pertaining to knowledge sharing. Such risks may include 
diffusion of the firm’s knowledge (Beeby and Booth, 2000) as the value of the shared knowledge diminishes, which may 
result in the loss of competitive advantage (Pardo, Cresswell, Thompson, and Zhang, 2007).. In strategic alliances, predicting 
and managing conflicts, which may be important sources of risk, is usually overlooked (Panteli and Sockalingam, 2005). 
According to Das and Teng (2001), there can be two types of risks in strategic alliances: relational risk and performance risk. 
Relational risk may arise because of the fact that partners may have their own individual interests that may conflict with those 
of other partners. This may result in opportunistic behavior, as described by Das and Teng (2001), such as cheating; 
distorting information or knowledge, and appropriating shared resources. In the supply chain, for instance, access to valuable 
logistics information can be used to seize control of cargo (Zhang and Li, 2006). Performance risk is basically related to the 
probability that alliance objectives may not be met despite good relations between partners (Das and Teng, 2001) such risk 
may arise because of new entrants to the industry, demand fluctuations, changing government policies, and lack of 
competence of partner firms. Table 1. summarizes types of the benefits and risks associated with knowledge sharing. 
 
Benefits Risks 
Knowledge acquisition Knowledge diffusion 
Synergistic opportunities Opportunistic behavior 
Solving problems Performance problems 
 
Table 1. Types of Knowledge Sharing Risks and Benefits 
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Knowledge sharing risks are not explicitly and widely discussed in the literature. Risks and benefits of knowledge sharing 
identified in the literature depend on the perspective taken to analyze knowledge sharing. For example, if that perspective 
was technical, risks can arise from unauthorized access to knowledge resources. This study will rely to a great extent on the 
results of the studies mentioned in the strategic perspective to identify knowledge-sharing risks that will be used later in the 
risk assessment model. 
 
Risk Assessment 
A significant amount of literature exists in the IT/IS risk assessment domain in general and risk assessment within inter-
organizational business networks in specific. The main focus of the risk assessment literature in the IS/IT is securing IT 
assets from external and internal threats. On the other hand, risk assessment in inter-organizational business networks 
analyzes the effects of business relations and collaboration.    
There are several IT risk assessment models proposed in literature. A typical risk assessment process begins with identifying 
data, information and technology assets that might be exposed to risk, and quantifying threats associated with them (Rees, 
Bandyopadhyay, and Spafford, 2003). This process can be challenging since evaluation in this domain can be highly 
subjective (Farahmand, Navathe, Sharp, and Enslow, 2003). After identifying those vulnerable assets and determining risk, 
experts can design and then select and apply the best protection mechanisms then evaluate them in an iterative manner. 
(Farahmand et al. 2003; Farahmand, Sharp, and Enslow, 2005)  Most of risk assessment models resemble the previously 
discussed logic. Examples of such models include: The Policy Framework for Interpreting Risk in E-business Security 
(PFIRES) designed by Rees et al. (2003), The Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems by 
(Stoneburner, Goguen, and Feringa, 2001), OCTAVE (Cert coordination center, 2003), and COBIT (IT governance institute, 
2001). Our proposed framework resembles the logic of these models as well, especially the preliminary phases used to 
identify assets and quantify risks.  
In addition to IT risk assessment models, another group of work that examines risk assessment techniques is relevant to our 
work. Zsidisin, Ellram, Carter, and Cavinato (2004) reviewed and evaluated different risk assessment frameworks within 
inbound supply chains. They analyzed the effect of using risk assessment processes including risks arising from the nature of 
relationships among participants such as goal conflict in a business relationship. In their proposal of a web-based risk 
assessment tool for distributed construction teams, Shang, Anumba, Bouchlaghem, Miles, Cen, and Taylor (2005) found that 
the use of this system offers flexibility and greater consistency among teams. Although knowledge sharing risks were not 
explicitly identified, complexity of relationships in such collaborative projects was addressed. In their analysis of the effect of 
information sharing on profitability, Kulp, Lee, and Ofek (2004)) highlighted the fact that information sharing should reduce, 
for instance, stock-out occurrence, also coordinate design, development, and introduction of new products. Such findings can 
be helpful for firms assessing effects of engaging into collaboration, and therefore, weight benefits against costs. Such 
analysis can be very useful in highlighting those risks arising from the nature of the relationship.  
While there are risk assessment frameworks for information security in specific business relationships such as the supply 
chains, there is no framework that can help analyze risks in inter-organizational knowledge sharing. Organization’s 
knowledge assets, which may be tacit or explicit, are vulnerable to threats when exposed to external organizations in the 
process of strategic, operational, formalized, or ad hoc collaboration arrangements. For example, in the context of 
collaborative product development, is there a risk that the firm’s partners acquire competencies that the sharing firm 
contributes to the product development? Is there a risk that those partners gain access to knowledge that the sharing firm uses 
in other business areas (Parker, 2000)? What kind of knowledge is being diffused through employee blogs or employee 
participation in technical discussion forums? Is the knowledge diffused strategic to the company? What are the most 
appropriate protection mechanisms in such situations?  Currently there exists no framework that can help managers address 
the above scenarios. In the next section, we build on past literature in risk assessment to develop a framework that can help in 
assessing risks of knowledge sharing, since knowledge can be derived from information and is often shared using information 
and communication technologies. However, knowledge loss and distortion can cost the firm greater losses since it takes years 
and more resources to develop knowledge, whether it was explicit or tacit. 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL 
A firm must go through a systematic methodology to assess inter-organizational knowledge sharing risk. In this paper, we 
extend previous risk assessment methodologies such as the NIST Risk Management Guide for Information Technology 
Systems (Stoneburner et al. 2001), and PFIRES by Rees et al. (2003), to develop a risk assessment framework that is suited 
for the inter-organizational knowledge sharing case. As mentioned previously, preliminary phases in our framework resemble 
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those in NIST and PFIRES but are modified to incorporate knowledge characteristics. The following discussion presents 
main steps in this model and the purpose, method, and output in each step: 
Identify Knowledge Assets 
According to Freeze and Kulkarni (2005), knowledge assets are “intangible assets that encompass the knowledge as well as 
the ability of an organization to leverage that knowledge, they can also be the technology that facilitates the interaction of the 
knowledge with the human capital”.  So managers can identify and classify these assets as a start. This is important because 
being specific about the knowledge type can assist in identifying those threats and later identifying securing policy. 
 
Objective: To identify knowledge assets that need to be protected 
• Organizational knowledge assets may reside in people, documents etc. One approach that can be used to identify 
these assets is to sketch a tree diagram with different types of knowledge resources, so that managers can clearly 
spot and identify knowledge assets. 
Method  
• Start by locating knowledge assets. One useful way is to apply the knowledge reservoirs graph designed by Becerra-
Fernandez, Gonzalez, and Shabherwal (2004) as can be noted from Figure 2. Knowledge can be stored in one 
individual’s or expert’s mind as tacit knowledge or in groups as collective and synergistic (Becerra-Fernandez et al., 
2004). It can also be encapsulated in artifacts such practices (e.g. procedures and rules), technologies, and 
knowledge repositories. Another approach that can be applied is to use the set of measures of Knowledge Capability 
Areas (KCA) proposed by Freeze and Kulkarni (2005). These measures include lessons learned, knowledge 
documents or codified knowledge, expertise, and data. 
 
Figure 2. The Reservoirs of Knowledge (Adapted from Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2004)  
 
• Identify strategic knowledge assets by assessing their (1) value, (2) rareness and (3) imitability of each knowledge 
asset. This approach is based on the resource-based view of knowledge and designed to measure the competitive 
advantage provided by the knowledge asset (Carlsson, 2003). A knowledge resource is strategically important to an 
organization based on characteristics such as: 1) Value: Does the knowledge enable the firm to sense and respond to 
opportunities and threats in the business environment. 2) Rareness: To what extend do competing firms possess 
similar knowledge, and 3) Imitability: Is the knowledge resource costly and difficult to acquire for other 
organizations that do not own it to obtain or imitate 
 
Output: A list of strategic knowledge assets and their characteristics 
 
Identify Inter-organizational Knowledge Sharing Practices  
Objective: Identify business processes in general and any possible ad hoc situations in which knowledge assets are used and 
exchanged 
Method  
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• Identify key business processes executed by organizational units using the value chain model, for instance, or any 
business model that clearly represents the firm’s business processes and its relationships with suppliers, customers, 
and competitors. 
• Identify organization’s members and external partners involved in those business processes 
• Map previously identified knowledge assets to the business processes  
Output: A list of business processes, related knowledge assets and inter-organizational knowledge sharing activities 
 
This step is based on the notion that boundaries of the IT system must be defined in early stages of assessment (Stoneburner 
et al., 2001). In the context of this study, an organization should first define the scope of knowledge sharing process by 
identifying the business process, related knowledge assets and the activities in those processes that interface with external 
entities.  
     
Identify Collaboration Technologies 
 
Objective:  To identify the medium or collaboration technology through which knowledge is transferred among business 
processes. 
Method  
• Identify technologies used in the context of previously identified processes. For example, a collaboration technology 
might be discussion boards, WIKI’s, blogs…etc. This step leads to identifying vulnerabilities.  
Output: Develop a Process-Technology-Asset matrix to document the knowledge asset vulnerabilities. 
.    
 
Identify Vulnerabilities and Threats to Knowledge Assets 
Objective: Identify threats and vulnerabilities to knowledge assets 
Method:  
• List potential threats and vulnerabilities to knowledge assets. Vulnerability is defined by Stoneburner et al. (2001), 
as “A flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that could be 
exercised and result in a security breach or violation of the system’s security policy”. If two teams, for instance, are 
sharing best practices via online blogs, what kinds of vulnerabilities are there? Vulnerabilities can emerge from the 
technology itself, such as: unauthorized access to knowledge repositories or through the inadvertent release of 
strategic knowledge. Threats arising due to knowledge sharing include knowledge diffusion, opportunistic behavior 
and performance risk. Vulnerabilities may also arise from ad hoc collaboration. A manager may, for instance, 
monitor discussion forums to identify any incident of negative knowledge transfer.   
• Identify which of the above identified vulnerabilities apply to the knowledge assets under consideration 
 




Objective: Based on knowledge asset value, ease of transfer, and potential transfer mechanisms (Vulnerabilities, 
collaboration technologies), make assertions on knowledge asset vulnerabilities 
 
Method:  
1. Map knowledge assets to vulnerabilities 
2. For each mapping list, value of knowledge asset, ease of transfer, potential transfer mechanism 
3. Make assertions, as called by the Dempster-Shafer theory, on the vulnerability of knowledge asset through 
technology. For example: knowledge asset x is not vulnerable to diffusion through employee blogs. This can be 
based on the extent to which managers think that the shared knowledge will not be used beyond the collaboration 
agreement 
 
Output: Assertions on knowledge asset vulnerabilities 
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Provide Evidence 
Objective: Support previous assertions by evidence and estimate the likelihood of risk on these assertions 
 
Method:  
1. Expert judgment. Experts should support their assertions by evidence, which is assigned a specific value from 0-1 to 
measure its strength.  . For example an expert might decide that in order to evaluate whether knowledge sharing is 
risk free or not, it is important to focus on whether the intellectual property of this shared knowledge is protected, 
then the manager can input his/her own judgment about this threat. More specifically, a manager can have a 0.4 
belief that knowledge sharing is secure, a 0.10 belief that it is not secure, and a 0.50 level of ignorance indicating 
whether it is secure or not is unknown. Delphi methods can be used to help achieve consensus among experts or 
analysts, and therefore, avoid the effect of subjective judgment when the values are assigned (Sun, Rajendra, and 
Theodore, 2006). 
2. Calculate the plausibility that knowledge sharing is not secure, which is equal to 0.60, according to the numbers 
used in the previous step.    
 
Output: Assertions and risk likelihood estimates from multiple experts 
 
Calculate Risk 
Objective: Calculate risk by integrating estimates from multiple experts 
Method; Depmster-Shaefer model 
 
Based on likelihood of transfer and the strategic value of knowledge asset, we use a Dempster-Shafer theory based model to 
calculate risks (Demspter, 1968; Shafer 1976). that the Dempster-Shafer theory is based on the notion of combining separate 
pieces of evidence to calculate the probability of an event. It is a generalization of the Baysian theory of subjective beliefs 
and is widely applied in diverse domains including information systems risk assessment (Sun et al., 2006). 
The overall level of risk is calculated based on weights assigned for evidences within each assertion. The numbers associated 
with evidence and assertions such as the belief supporting the assertion and the belief negating the assertion can be assigned, 
as mentioned previously, by experienced managers and analysts.  
 
Output: Risk estimates 
 
Develop Policy 
After the overall level of risk is calculated, the firm needs to develop a security policy in order to mitigate these risks. More 
details about this step can be found in (Rees et al., 2003). One way, for example, is to focus on evaluating the reputation of 
the potential partners. As Bayer and Maier (2006) explained, this can help control opportunistic behavior.  
Figure 3 summarizes the previous steps in the risk assessment process. 
 
Figure 3: Risk assessment process 
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HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE 
Suppose that a computer manufacturer, as can be noticed from Figure 1, is considering collaboration and wants to evaluate 
risks of sharing knowledge, such as best practices applied in the computer manufacturing process, with another computer 
manufacturer. Figure 4 shows this chosen scenario from Figure 1. Team A and Team B are engaged into knowledge sharing 
through different communication channels, using diverse technologies, and exchanging different types of knowledge. For 
example, developers from different teams can share programming knowledge through discussion forums and WIKI’s 
 
Figure 4. Knowledge Sharing Scenario 
 
 
Managers will assess risks in this scenario through the following steps: 
1. Identify knowledge assets: as illustrated in Figure 2, these assets include tacit assets such as programming and 
management skills and explicitly codified ones such as customer and market research. Then, they will ask questions 
of value and rareness (Carlsson, 2003). For example: How many competing firms own such knowledge. 
2. Identify Inter-organizational Knowledge Sharing Practices:  In this case, it will be the product development business 
process.  
3. Identify collaboration technology. Sharing programming skills, for instance, makes use of Discussion boards and 
WIKI’s.   
4. Identify vulnerabilities and threats: Vulnerabilities that arise from the technology such as authentication and 
vulnerabilities that arise from people such as opportunistic behavior 
5. Make assertions: managers with the help of experts start to form their assertions from the highest-level. This 
assertion states that sharing best practices knowledge through WIKI’s has a positive effect on the sending party. If 
sharing best practices is risk free, it should be secure and synergistic, which represent the two sub-assertions of the 
main assertion. Figure 5 illustrates this model, which resembles the one used by Sun et al. (2006). According to 
Levy et al. (2003), knowledge sharing can be synergistic when both companies exchange knowledge and the 
company can yield additional value beyond the sum of companies’ individual knowledge. They also stated that 
knowledge sharing can be synergistic mostly in manufacturing companies. The rounded box and the two ovals 
represent assertion nodes, the main one is numbered 1 and the sub-assertions are numbered 1.1 and 1.2. 
6. Provide evidence: In order to support this assertion, evidence such as that sharing best practice can reduce cost, 
improve innovation, and coordination should be evaluated, again according to the beliefs of experts and managers. 
To evaluate whether sharing best practices is secure, companies will need to focus on evaluating the extent to which 
they think privacy is protected, for example: whether they have agreements that determine specific constraints to the 
use of WIKI’s, and the extent to which they trust their partners. The rectangular boxes in Figure (5) represent 
evidence that support the main assertion and each of the sub assertions. The relationships between assertions, 
whether main assertion and sub-assertions and higher-level sub-assertions and lower level sub-assertions should be 
defined using logical relationships such as and/or (Sun et al., 2006). 
7. Calculate risk: After identifying the evidence of assertions and the strength of the each evidence, the overall strength 
is computed to determine the level of risk.  
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8. Develop policy: If the situation analysis revealed unacceptable level of risk, which varies from a firm to another, 
experts will develop a policy to mitigate this risk. For example, if they think that there is not enough constraints on 
how knowledge is used via WIKI’s or blogs, they would recommend changes to the collaboration agreements. 
 
Figure 5. Evaluating Evidence and Assertions 
 
Table 2 summarizes steps and output in each one in this scenario. 
 
№ Step Output 
Type Form 
1 
Identify knowledge assets 
Tacit or explicit Best practices 
2 Identify Inter-organizational 
Knowledge Sharing Practices 
Product development 
3 Identify collaboration technology WIKI’s +Discussion boards 
4 
Identify vulnerabilities Authentication and opportunistic behavior 
Main Sub 
1.Sharing best 
practices has a 
positive impact 
1.1Sharing is secure 
5 Make assertions 
 1.2 Sharing best practices is 
synergistic 
E1.1 Best practices privacy is protected  
E1.2 Best practices intellectual property is protected 
E1.3 Partners are trusted 
E1.4 Sharing best practices reduces cost 
E1.5 Sharing best practices improves innovation 
6 Provide Evidence 
E1.6 Sharing best practices improves coordination 
7 Calculate risk Overall level of risk based on risk associated with 
evidence and sub-assertions 
8 Develop policy Improve authentication 
Update knowledge sharing constraints in 
collaboration agreement 
Table 2. Summary of Risk Assessment Process 
 
PROPOSED EVALUATION 
In this paper, we have demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed framework using an illustrative case. However, the utility 
of framework can only be assessed through a field study that will be designed to measure, for example, manager’s 
Aljafari and Sarnikar  A Framework for Assessing Knowledge Sharing Risks in 
  
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco, California August 6th-9th 2009 10 
satisfaction with this framework. More specifically, whether this framework can improve the risk assessment process in 
evaluating collaborative agreements and the extent to which this framework help reduce subjectivity in risk assessment 
compared to old models used in this domain.    
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Collaboration has attractive benefits that can lead organizations to overlook risks associated with it. Similar to information, 
knowledge is an important resource shared in such collaboration agreements.  This paper proposes a risk assessment model 
that builds on information security risk assessment models to address the security of strategic knowledge assets. It is unique 
in the sense that it is specific to knowledge sharing among inter-organizational teams, and that it addresses subjectivity in 
evaluating risk associated with such type of collaboration by applying the logic of the Dempster-Shafer theory of beliefs. 
However, the framework has some limitations that we intend to address in a future field study to implement and evaluate the 
framework. The underlying processes, for instance, is resource intensive and requires considerable effort on part of the 
managers to identify and value knowledge assets. In order to address this limitation, we plan to develop a knowledge-based 
decision support system that will automate and support the decision making tasks. A second limitation is related to the need 
to identify and analyze ad hoc collaboration by knowledge workers. Although this issue is considered in step 2 of our 
proposed process, is not very well addressed. We intend to further investigate mechanisms for addressing this issue. Finally, 
the framework focuses mostly on IT-based vulnerabilities as most communication among individuals and organizations 
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